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Greenwashing is a communication practice that consists of the deliberate and volun-
tary disclosure of environmentally misleading (or even false) information by a firm
and which the public understands to be deceptive. Although prior literature analyzes
greenwashing effects from the greenwasher perspective, the underlying perceptions
of managers in the decision-making process related to maintaining (or contracting a
new) a commercial partner, client, supplier, or other stakeholder who is a
greenwasher, remain underexplored. This work empirically examines how green-
washing could influence managers' decision-making and whether a moderation effect
of attitude toward environmental management exists in this relationship. In doing so,
this work relies on experimental design.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
At the end of January 2018, the media revealed an environmental
scandal involving the German automotive group Volkswagen. The
European Research Group of the Environment and Health in the
Transport Sector (EUGT), a research organization funded by the
Volkswagen Group, Daimler and BMW, had funded experiments using
monkeys and humans in 2014 (Mühlauer, Brüssel, Dodt, Hägler, and
Ott, 2018; Ewing, 2018). In the experiments, both monkeys and
humans inhaled gases from diesel and gasoline vehicles over a period
of time, and scientists then compared the harmful effects in both sce-
narios. The objective of these experiments was to demonstrate that
new diesel vehicles were cleaner than older models, without consider-
ing how unethical the experiments were. In addition, a scandal known
as Dieselgate preceded this incident, in which the automotive com-
pany developed illegal software that manipulated emissions to evade
legal standards (Ewing, 2018). Volkswagen's objective in this decep-
tive manipulation (Siano, Vollero, Conte, & Amabile, 2017) was to
announce that its vehicles complied with the Clean Air Act in the
United States, to promote the idea that the company produced less-
polluting vehicles, and thus, to sell more diesel cars in an American
market dominated by gasoline vehicles. Both environmental scandals
at Volkswagen exemplify greenwashing, defined as the selective dis-
closure of environmental information by companies, concerning prac-
tices that exclusively portray positive environmental performance
(and even hide practices with poor environmental performance),
intending to project a positive corporate environmental image
(Bowen, 2014; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 2013).
However, despite these greenwashing practices, the Volkswagen
Group was the largest automaker according to sales volume in 2018
and 2019, with more than 10.3 million units sold in 2019. This circum-
stance encourages reflection: is it possible that the behavior of a
greenwasher does not affect its corporate image, and therefore, its
relations with stakeholders? In this work, we examine this topic by
analyzing greenwashing effects from the perspective of managers'
perceptions in their decision-making process.
In the academic arena, Lyon and Maxwell (2011) provided the
first economic model regarding greenwashing. Several studies have
empirically analyzed greenwashing and its relationship with firm vari-
ables, including its effect on firm profitability (e.g., Walker &
Wan, 2012), or its influence on firm communication strategies
(e.g., Guo, Tao, Li, & Wang, 2017; Mahoney, Thorne, Cecil, &
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LaGore, 2013), among other relations. However, several important
aspects concerning how managers perceive greenwashing in the
decision-making process remain unexplored in the academic literature.
Prior literature has focused on how the existence of perceived green-
washing could affect the consumers' or the general public's decision
making. For instance, de Vries et al. (2015) analyzed the general pub-
lic's tendency to be suspicious of the greenwasher behavior of compa-
nies in the energy industry. Similarly, several researchers (e.g., Nyilasy,
Gangadharbatla, & Paladino, 2014; Szabo & Webster, 2020) have
studied how perceived greenwashing, through green advertising,
could affect the consumers' reactions and their purchasing decisions.
Nevertheless, the perceived effects of greenwashing and how they
affect the decision-making skills of managers have not been previ-
ously studied in depth. Furthermore, Torrelli, Balluchi and
Lazzini (2020) analyzed whether the existence of misleading commu-
nications about environmental issues affects the stakeholders' percep-
tion of the company. But how is this relationship perceived from
managers' point of view? In other words, would managers be willing
or not willing to maintain or initiate business relationships with stake-
holders who were greenwashers or brownwashers? The answers to
these questions are the main novelties of this study and it attempts to
contribute to prior literature on the symbolic environmental behav-
iors, in general, and on greenwashing, in particular. In other words,
current wisdom has examined greenwashing from the perspective of
the greenwasher, but few studies examine the effect of greenwashing
on managers when they perceive that external stakeholders (e.g., their
commercial partner, client, or supplier) is a greenwasher. In this study,
the focus is on analyzing if one-half of a business relationship, that is,
being a greenwasher, can influence the managerial decision making of
the other half. We also examine whether the general attitude toward
the importance of environmental management could moderate this
effect.
The analysis of managerial perceptions, attitudes, and deci-
sions is highly complex. This is because when questioning man-
agers about these types of variables, it is difficult to isolate the
effect of specific opinions or perceptions from more general indi-
vidual values. To address this methodological problem, we pro-
posed to test the relationship using an experimental procedure.
Experiments in management research help correctly assess the
direction of causality between two (or more) variables (Chatterji,
Findley, Jensen, Meier, & Nielson, 2016). Using this methodologi-
cal device, researchers can randomly assign subjects to a specific
treatment and control group that they are interested to analyze
and isolate from other treatments or effects (Chatterji et al., 2016;
Delmas & Aragón Correa, 2016). We consider that this manipu-
lated isolation is crucial for determining the underlying factors in
managerial decisions, given the existence of perceived greenwash-
ing. Consequently, the objective of this study is to analyze the
relationship between greenwashing and managerial decisions and
to determine whether the “green” attitude of individuals might
moderate this relationship. In doing so, this study proposes an
experimental procedure based on both stimuli and items previously
tested in the literature.
2 | THEORETICAL REVIEW
2.1 | Greenwashing concept
The greenwashing concept has been defined by several authors,
(e.g., Furlow, 2010; Mitchell & Ramey, 2011; Ramus & Montiel, 2005)
and according to the Oxford English Dictionary, as “disinformation
disseminated by an organization so as to present an environmentally
responsible public image.” Although there is no explicit reference of
the intentions of the greenwashing practices in this definition, it
shows that it is a deliberate action due to two connotations. On the
one hand, greenwashing practices have an objective to achieve a
responsible public image; then, greenwashing practices are
implemented with the intention of presenting a false/misleading
image that the organization is green. On the other hand, “disinforma-
tion” implies a heavy connotation of deliberate false information. That
is why, from this definition, it is possible to assume that greenwashing
is deliberate and intentional. In this sense, Mitchell and Ramey (2011)
affirmed that greenwashing comes from the combination of two con-
cepts: green and brainwashing. These connotations have pushed
other authors to define the concept in a different way by adding some
other overtones. One of the most widely accepted definitions is that
of Lyon and Maxwell (2011), who defined greenwashing as “the selec-
tive disclosure of positive information about a company's environ-
mental or social performance, without fully disclosing the negative
information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly positive
corporate image” (p. 9). These authors understand greenwashing as
the disclosure of only environmental successful information while
remaining silent when this information is not in their self-interest. In
this case, the intentional aspect is still present in the definition, but
the “disinformation” connotation has been deleted. In their theoretical
work, Delmas and Burbano (2011) emphasized that greenwashers
simultaneously combine two firm behaviors, as follows: having poor
environmental performance and communicating positively about it,
which seems to agree with the symbolic and deliberate action of
greenwashing. Furthermore, Bowen (2014) considered greenwashing
a subset of communication activities within a broader theoretical
component, symbolic corporate environmentalism, which is defined as
“a set of meanings and representations that are shared in the environ-
ment and put in place by managers within organizations for environ-
mental reasons” (Bowen, 2014, p. 31). Bowen (2014) summarized
three cornerstones that prior studies have considered regarding
greenwashing: it should (a) focus on disseminating selective corporate
information, (b) be a deliberate option, (c) be an activity initiated and
managed by the firm (Bowen, 2014). The author concludes with two
main ideas: greenwashing is a “merely symbolic” and deliberate
action. In addition, other studies have indicated a fourth cornerstone
regarding external accusation (de Vries, Terwel, Ellemers, &
Daamen, 2015; Seele & Gatti, 2017), that is, for greenwashing to
occur, it is necessary to “be co-constructed in the eye of the
beholder” (Seele & Gatti, 2017, p. 239). However, despite the fact
that one of the main cornerstones of greenwashing is that it must be
perceived by “the eye of the beholder” (Seele & Gatti, 2017), some
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companies could be greenwashing unintentionally. For example,
Heras-Saizarbitoria, Boiral and Díaz de Junguitu (2020) considered
that companies sometimes use an environmental certification to com-
ply with certain requirements and for auditing purposes. In such
instances, companies are not fully interested in misleading or hiding
negative information, but is rather carrying out certain environmental
practices in a symbolic way (Ferrón-Vílchez, Darnall, & Aragón
Correa, 2017) to comply with the legislation or with the requirements
of certain stakeholders, mainly regulators, customers and suppliers
(Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2017; Heras-Saizarbitoria et al., 2020). Although
the definitions of greenwashing differ, since the connotations regard-
ing its intentions have been changing over time, we consider that
greenwashing complies with four main assumptions: it involves the
(a) voluntary disclosure of misleading (or even false) environmental
information that must (b) be planned (c) be initiated by the company
and (d) be understood as misleading by the public.
2.2 | Greenwashing under stakeholders'
engagement view
Although the definition of greenwashing is still scattered, and a
debate exists in the literature about how these practices are devel-
oped by companies, we consider greenwashing as a group of symbolic
environmental practices born in response to the stakeholders' pres-
sures (Albertini, 2014; Chiu & Wang, 2015; D'Amico, Coluccia, Fon-
tana, & Solimene, 2016; Huang & Kung, 2010; Velte, 2020). The
integration of the stakeholders' needs into the strategy of the organi-
zations could be explained by the so-called stakeholders' engagement.
This concept, also known as stakeholders' integration capacity, was
defined by Sharma and Vrendenburg (1998) as “the ability to establish
trust-based collaborative relationships with a wide variety of stake-
holders” (p. 735). According to this concept, firms develop a strategic
gradual process through the stakeholders' engagement mechanisms
with the objective of obtaining information about the stakeholders'
environmental interests and expectations, which also allows stake-
holders to participate in the firms' environmental decision-making pro-
cess (Garcés-Ayerbe, Rivera-Torres, & Suárez-Perales, 2019). This
process of integrating the stakeholders' interests into the firm's envi-
ronmental strategy could sometimes result in the firm's adaptation of
the stakeholders' requirements through proactive or advanced envi-
ronmental practices (Ferrón-Vílchez et al., 2017; Murillo-Luna, Gar-
cés-Ayerbe, & Rivera-Torres, 2008). Other times, the result of the
stakeholders' pressure could be a misleading disclosure of the green
actions. In other words, in these cases, the stakeholders' demands
could result in a reactive response. Several firms could be motivated
to be greenwashers as a reactive response using which the company
can shield itself (at least until its intention is discovered, thus breaking
down the trust-based relationship) from the external stakeholders'
pressures, especially when the firms operate in “environmentally sen-
sitive” or polluting industries (Cho & Patten, 2007). Prior literature
indicates that the level of external pressures perceived by the
greenwasher could explain the motivations for adopting this symbolic
environmental approach. This level differs depending on several fac-
tors, such as the sector in which the firm operates (de Vries
et al., 2015; Ramus & Montiel, 2005), level of stringency of political
scrutiny concerning environmental issues (Marquis, Toffel, &
Zhou, 2016), or a firm's environmental performance before planning
greenwashing (Cho & Roberts, 2010; Cho & Patten, 2007; Clarkson,
Li, Richardson & Vasvari, 2007), among other variables. For instance,
Kim and Lyon (2015) noted that greenwashing practices are more
likely to appear in companies that are subject to greater sector regula-
tions (e.g., the electric utility industry), which translates into stronger
external pressure. On the other hand, other firms could be motivated
to greenwash as a proactive response, when it attempts to create a
competitive advantage based on improvements in environmental rep-
utation and corporate image (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015; Marquis
et al., 2016). In fact, several authors have suggested that greenwash-
ing practices are common in companies with less dependence on pub-
lic regulators (Delmas & Montes-Sancho, 2010) and less pressure
from environmental activist groups (Marquis et al., 2016). Regardless
of whether the greenwasher does so as a reactive or proactive
response, we consider that ultimately greenwashers might be inter-
ested primarily in building a better corporate image than their real
image, intending to satisfy the environmental demands of stake-
holders such as clients, suppliers, regulators, and society in general
(Lyon & Montgomery, 2015).
3 | HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
3.1 | Effect of perceived greenwashing on
managerial decision-making
González Benito and González Benito (2006) considered that three
types of environmental management practices exist: organizational
and planning practices (which define environmental policies and
objectives at the corporate level); operational practices (which imply
the inclusion of the specific changes concerning environmental
impacts in the productive systems); and communication practices
(whose objective is to disclose the firm's environmental commitment
to the general society). Greenwashing might be included in the latter
category of the environmental management practices.
Furthermore, when the two dimensions specified by Delmas and
Burbano (2011) are combined (i.e., environmental performance and
green communication), two types of firms emerge related to the envi-
ronmental communication: firms with a positive environmental perfor-
mance that communicates this performance to the general public that
are recognized as the greenest companies; and firms with poor envi-
ronmental performance that are recognized as the brown companies
(Delmas & Burbano, 2011). According to Kim and Lyon (2015),
another type of firm, known as brownwashers, exists. These include
firms with positive environmental performance whose communica-
tions understates their environmental achievements. Furthermore, we
also consider the group called “passivists,” that are firms with poor
environmental performance and no environmental communications.
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Table 1 summarizes these four types of firm behaviors regarding the
positive/poor environmental performance and doing green/not doing
green communications.
In relation to these types of firm's behaviors concerning environ-
mental communication, it is essential to highlight that, although it has
been assumed that environmental communication practices try to
establish relationships with a variety of stakeholders around the com-
pany (González Benito and González Benito, 2006), the effect of these
practices on managerial decisions has hardly been studied. With
regard to the managerial decisions, we consider that, in the presence
of perceived greenwashing, managers might doubt the environmental
commitment of the greenwashing partner (Seele & Gatti, 2017). This
could undermine the contractual relationship between the company
and the greenwashing client/supplier. For instance, the scandals at
Volkswagen could deteriorate relations with equipment manufac-
turers who supply its motor and mechanical parts (and who do not
belong to the German group). Suppliers may even be willing to break
their contracts with Volkswagen if they believe that the group's nega-
tive environmental image may harm their own image. Further, this
same logic can be applied to other stakeholders, such as environmen-
talists, community groups, employees, consumers, potential share-
holders and investors, public regulators and society as a whole
(Skarmeas & Leonidou, 2013). Following this example, managers of
the suppliers for Volkswagen could refuse to continue working with
the German automotive group for fear that other sector members
might stop purchasing their products or to avoid exposure to the spot-
light of public regulators, who could take action (such as legal sanc-
tions or penalties) on greenwashing behaviors. The “contagion effect”
of being linked to a greenwasher could be interpreted as a negative
motivation by managers, because it could harm the related firm's rep-
utation (Skarmeas & Leonidou, 2013; Siano et al., 2017). Conse-
quently, managers attempt to avoid any punishment from
stakeholders due to the spread of greenwashing. Considering the
decision to trade with greenwashers might harm their firm's reputa-
tion and profitability (de Vries et al., 2015), managers will be less
likely to enter contractual relationships with greenwashers when
greenwashing is publicly known. Following this idea, managers will
attempt to encourage and promote business relationships with the
greenest firms, because of the positive influence this could have on
their reputation and image. Furthermore, relating to this point, we
consider that brownwashers are stuck in the middle, since managers
are more willing to maintain their business relationships with them
than with greenwashers but, at the same time, prefer to be related
to the greenest firms instead of to brownwashers. Thus, we hypoth-
esized as follows:
Hypothesis 1a. Managers are less willing to have business relationships
with greenwashers, as compared to the greenest firms,
brownwashers, and passivists.
Hypothesis 1b. Managers are more willing to have business relation-
ships with the greenest firms, as compared to greenwashers,
brownwashers, and passivists.
Hypothesis 1c. Managers are more willing to have business relation-
ships with brownwashers, as compared to greenwashers and less
willing to have business relationships with brownwashers, as com-
pared to the greenest firms.
3.2 | Moderating effect of green attitude on the
relationship between perceived greenwashing and
managerial decision-making
Prior literature highlights the role of personal activism in environ-
mental decision making (e.g., Anderson & Bateman, 2000; Egri &
Herman, 2000). Several studies examine the connection of manage-
rial background to the environmental decision-making process, such
as the adoption of advanced environmental practices or eco-
initiatives (Ramus & Steger, 2000). In fact, managerial attitudes and
preferences when implementing environmental advanced practices
and green strategies were seminal topics in the initial academic
literature on environmental management. This is demonstrated by
the publication of several studies on the “green” attitudes and
preferences of managers in the special issue of Academy of Manage-
ment Journal (AMJ) in 2000 called “Special Research Forum on the
Management of Organizations in the Natural Environment”
(e.g., Anderson & Bateman, 2000; Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Egri &
Herman, 2000; Flannery & Douglas, 2000; Ramus & Steger, 2000;
Sharma, 2000).
According to De la Torre, Aragón-Correa, & Martín-
Tapia, (2015:452), “environmental decisions have three relevant charac-
teristics: a high degree of uncertainty, a strong emotional component and
a social acceptance bias toward more pro-environmental positions.”
Thus, we consider that these three circumstances could add an addi-
tional degree of complexity to the environmental decision-making
process, affecting the factors that determine this process and the role
that individuals play in it. For instance, recently, several members of
the Business Roundtable called for greater social and environmental
responsibility of companies (e.g., Gelles and Yaffe-Bellany, 2019).
However, this “call for responsibility” has had both support and
TABLE 1 Firm behavior combining environmental performance and green communication
Environmental performance
Poor Positive
Green communications Yes Greenwashers (Delmas and Burbano 2011) Greenests
No Passivists (Ferrón et al., 2017) Brownwashers (Kim and Lyon, 2015)
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skepticism (The New York Times, 2019). Twenty years after the publi-
cation of the special issue in AMJ, this claim is a “novelty” in the busi-
ness scheme, as most CEOs of multinational companies do not usually
publicly proclaim their individual preferences or opinions toward the
protection of the environment and other social issues. This public
claim could be interpreted as a “statement of intent” by some mem-
bers of the Business Roundtable, who could decide to transfer
(or even have already transferred) their individual attitude toward
environmental protection and social issues to the daily operations in
their firms.
Regarding the relationship between perceived greenwashing
and managerial decision making and based on prior literature about
managerial perceptions of environmental issues in management
(e.g., Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Sharma, 2000) we consider that this
individual attitude toward a greater managerial responsibility con-
cerning environmental issues (we labeled it “green attitude”) could
influence this link (Cordano & Frieze, 2000). That is, managers with
very high levels of green attitude are likely to be more reluctant to
a greenwasher approach to a greater extent, than managers with
no green attitude (or lower levels), as they understand the need to
protect the environment and its translation to management prac-
tices in the company. In their decision making, it is likely that they
refuse to maintain business relationship with stakeholders such as
commercial clients, suppliers, partners or shareholders who are
prone (or even accused) to greenwashing. We consider that man-
agers with high levels of green attitude will foster business rela-
tionships with the greenest firms and the brownwashers, having
more willingness to start or maintain business relationships with
these types of firms, especially in comparison with greenwashers.
Having a high level of green attitude could be translated by a more
qualified manager who detects, understands and interprets the
organizations' environmental signals even in the absence of clear
green communications. In contrast, managers with low levels of
green attitude are less concerned, even less alert, about environ-
mental management in their companies (Cordano & Frieze, 2000),
and consequently, the stakeholders having greenwashing behavior
goes unnoticed and affects them to a lesser extent in their mana-
gerial decision-making. Consequently, we hypothesize that green
attitude moderates the effect of perceived greenwashing on mana-
gerial decision-making, as follows:
Hypothesis 2. Managerial green attitude moderates the relationship
between the greenwasher, brownwasher or the greenest firm, and
managerial decision-making.
Hypothesis 2a. Under a high level of green managerial attitude, the will-
ingness to have business relationships with the greenwashers is
weakened compared to a low level of green managerial attitude.
Hypothesis 2b. Under a high level of green managerial attitude, the will-
ingness to have business relationships with the brownwashers or




We relied on experimental procedure to test our hypotheses. Specifi-
cally, we opted for a framed field experiment, which employs non-
standard subject pool (in our case, students as future managers) in a
field context in either the commodity, task, or information set that the
subjects can use (in our case, managerial perceptions about green-
washing and subsequent decision-making) (Harrison & List, 2004).
Owing to the nature of our research hypotheses, the use of framed
field experiments is especially appropriate in our work, as they can
provide useful insights about managerial behavior (Delmas & Aragón
Correa, 2016) and significant and actionable implications for the firm
(Chatterji et al., 2016). Additionally, an experimental design is pre-
ferred to maximize the power of the tests for the moderation effects
(Frazier, Tix, & Barron, 2004).
Proceeding with the experimental design, we use Qualtrics, which
is an online software for survey development to run experiments and
enable interaction with participants and launching different steps.
With this tool, we could control the experiment phases considering
the times and guarantee the lack of bias, such as related to
researcher-participant interaction. We invited participants to com-
plete the survey hosted online, along with different experimental
stimuli. We explained that we would ask participants to examine some
information from a firm and answer some questions. Figure 1 shows
the three sequential phases that comprised the procedure. First, we
gathered data prior to the experimental stimulus, which made it possi-
ble to obtain some information from each participant on their opinions
and attitudes toward environmental management and corporate and
media information.
Second, Qualtrics randomly assigned every participant to one of
the four levels of treatment: (2) x Type of media news and (2) x
Type of corporate website. Owing to the random assignment, the
number of cases in each treatment ranged from 66 to 68 cases per
treatment. Finally, it redirected the participants to the survey, where
they were asked to respond to the items concerning our dependent
variable and the manipulation checks. We established a control to
delete observations from participants who took very little time
answering the survey (−67% of the average of 127 seconds) or odd
little time answering the survey (−46% of the average of
587 seconds). In all, we withdrew 24 invalid observations, because
they indicated little attention receiving the stimuli or answering the
questionnaire.
4.2 | Participants and sample
The final sample consisted of 243 undergraduate students from four
degrees related to business and management studies. The socio-
demographic characteristics reflected a typical homogenous distribu-
tion of the sample in terms of gender, age, and type of studies as
Table 2 shows.
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We use undergraduate students enrolled in management degrees,
who serve as potential managers. Although the use of students has
been questioned, prior literature considers that using alumni as subjects
is adequate for measuring managerial decisions (e.g., Chaudhary, 2019;
Christensen & Kohls, 2003; Harrison & List, 2004) and environmental
decisions (e.g., De la Torre et al., 2015; Rikhardsson & Holm, 2008;
Sciarelli, Tani, Landi & Turriziani, 2020). In fact, numerous studies based
on greenwashing have used undergraduate students as subjects
(e.g., de Vries et al., 2015; Nyilasy, Gangadharbatla, & Paladino, 2014).
This may be because of the lack of cooperation by managers in experi-
mental settings or the high cost of conducting field experiments (Abdel-
khalik, 1974; Hughes & Lucas-Gibson, 1991).
Although students are acceptable as valid participants in field
experiments, there are some differences in the decision-making of
students and managers in the same environment. For instance, Cole
and Smith (1996) compared the ethical standards of experienced busi-
nesspeople and college senior business students, demonstrating that
students have weaker ethical values than do businesspeople. This was
in line with the conclusions of Petrof, Sayegh, & Vlahopoulos, (1982),
who argued that business faculties might be fostering egocentric
rather than society-centric values to their students. Further, Smith,
Skalnik, & Skalnik, (1999) conducted a field experiment using students
as participants to observe the differences between the decision-
making of employed MBA students and those of marketing managers
in the work of Fritzche and Becker (1983). Both studies present a vari-
ety of ethical dilemmas, where a marketing executive was involved in
a personal business venture that conflicts with the company's respon-
sibilities. Smith et al. (1999) confirmed that some differences existed
in all the ethical components measured. The results showed that MBA
students would act more ethically when the dilemma they face
becomes riskier. As a result of prior research that used alumni as sub-
jects in experimental designs, we were aware of the bias when
employing students as subjects. Therefore, after conducting our
experiment and obtaining the empirical results, we carried out a quali-
tative cross-validation process involving 10 managers, to assess the
external validity of our experimental results (please see section 5.4.
Cross-validation check). In addition, we took several other actions
during our experiment to alleviate the effect of this bias. First, before
beginning the experiment, we asked students to act as company man-
agers. The detailed text is as follows: “To carry out the following activ-
ity, imagine that you have finished your studies and are working in a
medium-high management position in a large company, that is, with
responsibility to make relevant decisions in the company. Please, assume
this role and carefully follow the instructions below.” Second, we asked
participants about their professional experience (29.6% of the sample
has previous professional experience). Our aim was to test that there
were no differences between the decision-making of students with
previous professional experience and the ones with no previous expe-
rience. In doing so, we conducted a mean difference test and the
results showed that there were no statistically significant differences
in terms of their opinion about firm environmental management (t-
test = 1.26; p = .21), media and corporate communication (t-test = 1.24;
p = .22) and personal green attitude (t-test = 0.28; p = .78). Third, as
the experimental context was adapted to be relevant for participants
(i.e., they were asked to act as managers), the participants evaluated
F IGURE 1 Experimental design




Age 17 to 19 51.4%
20 to 22 41.6%
Over 22 7.0%
Professional experience Yes 29.6%
No 70.4%
Degree Management and business
administration
20.6%
Accounting and finance 14.8%
Marketing and market research 15.6%
Law and management and
business administration
49.0%
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this circumstance as follows. At the end of the experiment, the partici-
pants were asked to answer several questions about how they value
the experience of being a participant in this experiment in relation to
their management studies, from 1 (completely disagree) to
7 (completely agree). Table 3 presents these items.
The results showed that the experiment had high value for the
students. For instance, item 3 had the highest score (5.83/7), in which
participants showed that the experiment was an important activity for
management, followed by item 4, which showed the importance of
the experiment for the participant's studies (5.56/7). These high
values represent relevant activities for future managers who are spe-
cializing for the business world.
Our efforts to mitigate the effects of potential bias in using stu-
dents in our experiment concluded that management alumni were
acceptable as valid participants in experimental design, as we had not
detected any abnormal results. Therefore, we consider management
students in our experiment as future managers, which present a valid
sample for testing our proposed hypotheses.
4.3 | Stimulus development
Following Delmas and Burbano (2011)'s definition about greenwash-
ing, which states that greenwashers combine to have poor environ-
mental performance and make positive communication about it, our
manipulated variables that frame the stimulus were corporate commu-
nication disclosure and environmental performance. Corporate com-
munication disclosure had two levels: (a) the disclosure of firm
mission/vision/values (MVV) with green message versus (b) the disclo-
sure of firm MVV with general corporate message. Firm environmen-
tal performance also had two levels: (a) positive environmental
performance versus (b) poor environmental performance.
Participants received information about a fictitious chemical com-
pany, Nitraldansa, via a screenshot of a corporate website homepage
(for manipulating the disclosure of MVV) and a news article about the
environmental behavior of the fictitious company (for manipulating
environmental performance). We opted to depict a fictitious company
to avoid any distortion of the results due to company familiarity or
pre-existing company perceptions (de Vries et al., 2015; Nyilasy
et al., 2014; Parguel, Benoît-Moreau, & Larceneux, 2011).
To manipulate MVV, we created a fictional screenshot of the inter-
face of Nitraldansa's website to communicate the firm's perspective
under a green or a general corporate profile. According to Parguel
et al. (2011), the use of a website interface in experimental procedures
is recommended primarily because corporate websites are one of the
most frequently used and widespread mediums to communicate corpo-
rate social responsibility practices. Further, “online CSR communication
influences corporate evaluation after a single exposure, because corporate
image generally is malleable compared with corporate reputation and can
be modified rapidly through adequate communication” (Parguel
et al., 2011, p. 20). To differentiate the two treatments for MVV in the
stimulus website, we used an identical interface of the webpage and
very similar text in both, the general corporate MVV and the green
MVV (see Appendix A and Appendix B). However, in the green MVV,
we incorporated several concepts and keywords related to environmen-
tal management issues, such as environmental innovations, eco-effi-
ciency, ecological footprint, and sustainable development. We validated
these concepts and words as “environmental” in the database for
experiments (e.g., Redondo, Fraga, Padrón & Comesaña, 2007). Appen-
dix A and Appendix B show the differences in the texts of both cases.
To manipulate environmental performance, we used the publica-
tion of news about the environmental behavior of the fictitious com-
pany, Nitraldansa, in mass media. The two treatments that we
attempted to manipulate were positive versus poor environmental
performance. In the case of positive environmental performance, we
relied on the proposal of Nyilasy et al., (2014), who created news
about an award for being the company in the sector that makes the
greatest efforts to protect the environment. In the case of poor per-
formance, we created news in which Nitraldansa could not win the
environmental award because it had not complied with the required
environmental minimums. Appendix C shows the differences in the
text of both the positive and the negative news. Similar to Parguel
et al. (2011), we created the interface of an article extracted from a
fictitious Spanish daily newspaper (see Appendix C).
By combining these four treatments of stimulus (2 × 2), four
experimental groups emerged: (a) “passivists”, our control group and
the treatment that compiled the general corporate MVV on the
website and the negative news; (b) “greenwashers,” the treatment
that collected the green MVV on the website and the negative news;
(c) “brownwashers,” the treatment that compiled the general corpo-
rate MVV on the website and the positive news; and (d) “greenests,”
the treatment that brought together the green MVV on the website
and the positive news.
4.4 | Measures
Our analyzed variables were “managerial decision” and “green atti-
tude.” Further, we also measured “perceived greenwashing” as a
manipulation check.
TABLE 3 Student ratings on their participation in the experiment
Items Mean SD
VAL1: The content of the activity has
been relevant for my professional
development in the business economic
world.
4.19 1.48
VAL2: I positively value the content of
the activity for my professional
development in the business economic
world.
4.69 1.50
VAL3: The activity addresses current and
important issues for business
management.
5.83 1.38
VAL4: Making decisions assuming the
role of a company manager has been
relevant for my studies.
5.56 1.42
FERRÓN-VÍLCHEZ ET AL. 7
To measure “managerial decision,” we relied on adapted items
from the validated scales of De la Torre et al., (2015) and Chatterji
et al. (2016), which were multiple-item scales that question subjects
about the extent they would be willing to accept several business
decisions (with their level of information about Nitraldansa). Table 4
shows the items used. Subjects could answer the proposed items
using the seven-point responses from 1 = “nothing willing” to 7 = “fully
willing.”
We also measured the participants' general attitude toward the
importance of environmental management by relying on prior litera-
ture (e.g., De la Torre et al., 2015). For this issue, the questionnaire
included four items to measure this green attitude by asking partici-
pants about their level of agreement or disagreement (i.e., from
1 = “total disagreement” to 7 = “full agreement”) concerning the items
that are shown in Table 4. Note that the subjects were asked these
statements before they were exposed to the treatment, as rec-
ommended by prior literature (e.g., Castañeda-García, Frías-Jamilena,
Rodríguez-Molina, & Jones, 2019).
We conducted reliability and dimensionality analyses to confirm
the validity of these scales (Churchill, 1979; Anderson &
Gerbing, 1988). For reliability, we determined Cronbach's alpha
(Cronbach, 1970). The item-total correlations for each element of the
scales (Bagozzi, 1994) were greater than 0.34 (Nurosis, 1993), in sup-
port of internal consistency. In a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA),
we evaluated the scales' dimensionality (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, &
Black, 1998), which enabled us to calculate the average of the indica-
tors that constitute the construct. In that case, we could use a single
variable to represent the theoretical constructs (Anderson and
Gerbing, 1988). Further, we required factorial loading (λ) to be greater
than 0.6, with a significant total explained variance (Hair et al., 1998).
The relevant analyses supported the proposed scales. Consequently,
Cronbach's alpha test shows acceptable reliability indices for the man-
agerial decision scale (α = .93) and for the green attitude scale
(α = .73) (Nunnally, 1978) and we could extract only one factor from
managerial decision (λ > 0.62; AVE = 0.56; CR = 0.92) and another
factor from green attitude (λ > 0.70; AVE = 0.56; CR = 0.83).
TABLE 4 Used items for managerial
decisions and green attitude
Items x SD
Managerial decisions - The extent you would be willing…
MD1 …to become a Nitraldansa supplier. 4.26 1.54
MD2 …to become a Nitraldansa customer/client. 3.90 1.61
MD3 …to collaborate for R&D purposes or to launch a new
product with Nitraldansa.
4.62 1.72
MD4 …to acquire shares or to be part of the Nitraldansa
ownership structure.
3.80 1.65
MD5 …to acquire Nitraldansa in full. 2.95 1.77
MD6 …to merge with Nitraldansa. 3.34 1.71
MD7 …to be acquired by Nitraldansa. 2.92 1.65
MD8 …to create a joint venture or a temporary union of
companies with Nitraldansa.
3.74 1.64
MD9 …to be part of the Nitraldansa management staff. 4.31 1.74




GA1 Companies must always reduce their environmental
impact even if it can cause damage in terms of
profitability.
5.31 1.28
GA2a Companies have a right to damage the environment in
order to satisfy their needs whether or not it is
justified to improve profits.
1.76 1.15
GA3 The strategy of the company must always guarantee
the protection of the environment as a basic
principle from which other possibilities can be raised.
5.75 1.39
GA4 The decision-making process concerning
environmental matters is related to business
management and its study and analysis should be
included in the business and economics graduate
programs.
5.80 1.38
Source: Adapted from De la Torre et al. (2015) & Chatterji et al. (2016).
aWe include this item by reversing the wording to get a stronger and more valid measure of the green
attitude (Weijters & Baumgartner, 2012).
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In addition to these main variables, our questionnaire also
included several control variables as well as selection and manipula-
tion check measures. We controlled for several socio-demographic
and professional conditions of the subject, such as age, gender, pro-
fessional experience (number of months), if the subject has worked at
companies in highly polluting sectors, the sector in which the current
firm of the subject operates, and whether the current firm of the sub-
ject is environmentally certified. We also accounted for several sub-
ject perceptions and opinions that could affect the responses.
4.5 | Pre-tests
Before launching the experiment for the planned subject pools, we con-
ducted two types of pre-tests to analyze the degree of adequacy of
both the stimulus and the items presented in the questionnaire after
exposure to the stimulus. The first of these two pre-tests was related
to experimental stimuli. Similar to Nyilasy et al., (2014), we conducted a
quantitative pre-test using a sample of 45 undergraduate students. The
two website screenshots (with green MVV and with general corporate
MVV) were shown on a classroom screen and students were asked to
rate their agreement or disagreement (using a seven-point scale) with
the following two statements after exposure to each website screen-
shot: “The information and content of the website suggest that the com-
pany is an innovative company” and “The information and content of the
website suggest that the company is an environmentally friendly company.”
We ran descriptive statistics to compare means. As expected, for the
green MVV screenshot, subjects rated the company as environmentally
friendly (Mean = 5.33; SD =1.26; p < .00), and for the general corporate
MVV screenshot, subjects rated the company as innovative
(Mean = 4.79; SD = 1.63; p < .00). Using the same procedure, the two
news articles (i.e., news in which Nitraldansa won the environmental
award and news in which it did not win the environmental award) were
shown on the classroom screen. Students were asked to rate their
agreement or disagreement using a scale from 1 (completely disagree)
to 7 (completely agree) with the following two statements after expo-
sure of each news screenshot: “The information and content of the news
suggest that the company has positive environmental performance” and
“The information and content of the news suggest that the company has
poor environmental performance.” As expected, with regard to the posi-
tive news, subjects rated the company as having positive environmental
performance (Mean = 5.90; SD = 1.25; p < .00), and for the negative
news, subjects rated the company as having poor environmental perfor-
mance (Mean = 4.05; SD = 1.95; p < .00). These results suggest that the
manipulation of the stimulus significantly differed between the green/
general corporate MVV and from the positive/poor environmental per-
formance, showing that the treatments clearly collected the intended
green versus no green messages and they were perceived as realistic
(Nyilasy et al., 2014).
Additionally, to test the adequacy of the items presented in the
questionnaire after exposure to the stimulus, six faculty members
who had experience with experimental design in the social sciences
provided qualitative feedback. In the case of stimulus, the texts of
both MVV on the websites and in the news were modified to present
more homogenous wording between the green and no green treat-
ment. In addition, the experts recommended changing the order pre-
sentation of the manipulation check and control items, moving some
items from the end of the questionnaire to the beginning to avoid the
halo effect. Nonetheless, additional checks were made on the ade-
quacy of the manipulation of the experiment (please, see next
section).
5 | RESULTS
Before testing our hypotheses, we undertook some analyses on the
data to rule out the existence of common biases in experimental
design, such as is sample selection and manipulation in the stimuli.
5.1 | Sample selection bias
We assigned all the participants to one of the four experimental
groups. We ensure this circumstance using the random assignation of
Qualtrics (please see the Procedure section). Additionally, to ensure
well-balanced distribution of the participants across the four groups,
we calculated the association between each assigned group and four
socio-demographic characteristics (Castañeda-García et al., 2019). The
results of Table 5 show that the distribution of cases in terms of gen-
der, age, professional experience (yes/no) and type of degree to which
the participant belongs was across the four groups.
We also checked whether the combination of two stimuli
(i.e., webpage screenshot and the news) with two versions of each
could be misinterpreted, as some people may have a negative
(or positive) predisposition toward online information (either online
news or corporate websites). To account for this bias, the question-
naire included two scales to measure the attitudes toward the credi-
bility of online messages, according to Parguel et al. (2011). These
items question participants on their degree of agreement or disagree-
ment with the following statements: “The information and content pub-
lished by the newspapers seem totally credible to me” and “The
information and content published by the corporate websites seem totally
credible to me.” Subjects could choose from 1 (completely disagree) to
7 (completely agree). Note that we showed these two items before
exposing the subjects to the stimuli. We ran two analyses of variances
(ANOVAs) using these two items as dependent variables, and
TABLE 5 Test for association between the experimental groups
and the socio-demographic variables
Socio-demographic variable Chi-square (df) p-value
Gender 1.40 (3) .70
Age 3.54 (6) .74
Professional experience 4.88 (3) .18
Degree 3.21 (12) .99
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“assigned news” and “assigned website screenshot” as the indepen-
dent variables, respectively. The results demonstrated that there was
neither relationship between the attitudes toward the credibility of
online messages in newspapers and the treatment “assigned news”
(F = 2.63; p = .11), nor between the attitudes toward the credibility of
corporate websites and the treatment “assigned website screenshot”
(F = 0.67; p = .41). These findings led us to conclude that the attitudes
toward online information did not influence the manipulation of inde-
pendent variables.
5.2 | Manipulation checks
Although the pre-test could help ensure that the stimuli were operat-
ing correctly, running additional checks using the final sample is rec-
ommended (Castañeda-García et al., 2019). We then performed two
manipulation checks to prove the consistency of the stimuli. First, we
checked whether the group assigned as greenwasher (i.e., green MVV
and negative news) is associated with the previous scale measuring
perceived corporate greenwashing. In doing so, we used the multiple-
item scale, seven-point version (from 1-completely disagree to
7-completely agree) adapted from items offered by Leonidou and
Skarmeas (2017). Table 6 presents these items. Cronbach's alpha test
shows acceptable reliability indices for the perceived greenwashing
scale (α = .86) (Nunnally, 1978) and we could extract only one factor
from perceived greenwashing (λ > 0.70; AVE = 0.61; CR = 0.86). Fur-
ther, we ran ANOVA in which the dependent variable was “perceived
corporate greenwashing” and the factor that was the treatment
group. As expected, the results of this ANOVA showed that the mean
of the group “greenwashers” is the highest (Meangreenwashers = 5.36
vs. Meannon-greenwashers = 4.33; F = 27.37; p < .00). Consequently, the
score of perceived greenwashing by subjects was the greatest in the
case of the treatment “green MVV and negative news,” which demon-
strated that validated items in prior literature were correctly assigned
with the greenwasher group.
Second, we used two items that questioned participants—after
exposure to the stimuli—about their degree of agreement or disagree-
ment with the following statements: “The mission, vision, and values of
Nitraldansa, visible on its website, clearly focus on transmitting its total
commitment to the environment” and “Nitraldansa's website contains
content on the environmental aspects of the company.” Participants
could respond from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).
We ran a MANOVA considering these two items as dependent vari-
ables and the factor that was the assigned corporate website screen-
shot (green MVV or general MVV). The results showed that
participants assigned to the “green MVV” group presented higher
average scores for both items than those assigned to the “general
MVV” group (see Table 7). Similarly, we used two items to check the
consistency of the message in the news. These items questioned
participants—after exposure to the stimuli— about their degree of
agreement or disagreement with the following statements:
“Nitraldansa has good environmental performance” and “Nitraldansa is a
clear example for the other companies in the sector on treating the envi-
ronmental aspects in a company to guarantee low environmental
impact.” Participants could respond from 1 (completely disagree) to
7 (completely agree). We also ran a MANOVA considering these two
items as dependent variables and the factor that was the assigned
news (positive or negative). The results showed that subjects assigned
to the “positive news” group presented higher average scores for
both items than those assigned to the “negative news” group. Table 7
shows the findings of these check analyses. Obtained results con-
firmed those obtained from the pre-test.
5.3 | Testing the hypotheses
To test our hypotheses, for Hypotheses 1 (i.e., 1a, 1b and 1c), we ran
an ANOVA and a Bonferroni post hoc test for comparisons among the
treatment groups. Meanwhile, for Hypotheses 2 (i.e., 2a and 2b) we
run a hierarchical multiple regression to examine the moderator
effects because the moderator variable is measured as a continuous
scale (Aguinis, 1995; Frazier et al., 2004). To test Hypotheses 1, which
states that different levels of willingness exist to ensure business rela-
tionships are dependent on the different environmental communica-
tion behaviors, we ran an ANOVA in which the dependent variable is
“managerial decisions” and the factors are the four treatment groups
(i.e., greenwashers, brownwashers, greenests, and passivists). As
predicted, the greenwasher group had the lower mean in the managerial





Nitrandalsa presents a confusing message (using
certain words and images) about its environmental
behavior. 4.33 1.65
GW2 Nitrandalsa provides vague or seemingly unprovable
environmental claims about its environmental
performance.
4.56 1.60
GW3 Nitrandalsa overstates or exaggerates its
environmental behavior.
4.67 1.66
GW4 Nitrandalsa omits or hides important information about
its real environmental behavior.
4.79 1.71
Source: Adapted from Leonidou and Skarmeas (2017).
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decision variable followed by the passivists, the brownwashers and the
greenests, respectively (Meangreenwashers = 3.11 vs. Meanpassivists = 3.34
vs. Meanbrownwashers = 4.22 vs. Meangreenests = 4.37; F = 16.09; p < .00).
To examine the significance of these differences, we ran a Bonferroni
post hoc test, which suggested the best combination (Park, Lennon, &
Stoel, 2005). The results of Table 8 show that Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c
cannot be rejected, confirming that: (a) the greenwashing group gener-
ates the lowest willingness to have business relationships; (b) the
greenest group generates the highest willingness to have business rela-
tionships and; (c) brownwashing is better than greenwashing but worse
than the greenest option in terms of generating willingness to have busi-
ness relationships.
To test Hypothesis 2, which states that managerial green attitude
moderates the effect of the different environmental communication
behaviors on managerial decision-making, we ran a hierarchical multi-
ple regression. In this regression model, we developed two steps. In
step 1, the dependent variable was “managerial decisions”, and the
independent variables were three dichotomous variables for the treat-
ment groups greenwasher, brownwasher, and greenest, respectively
(where 1 means “yes”, and 0 means “no”), and the variable green atti-
tude. In step 2, three multiplicative terms were included to capture
the moderation effects between each treatment group and the green
attitude. Table 9 shows the results of these estimations. As expected,
there is a statistically significant negative interaction effect between
the greenwasher group and the green attitude (β = −1.45, B 95%
CI = [−1.16, −0.36]; p = .00). Meanwhile there are two statistically sig-
nificant positive interaction effects: one effect is between the
brownwasher group and the green attitude (β = 1.35, B 95%
CI = [0.35, 1.07]; p = .00), and the other positive effect is between the
greenest group and the green attitude (β = .87, B 95% CI = [0.06,
0.86]; p = .02).
The direction of these moderating effects is depicted in Figure 2.
When there is a high tendency toward environmental management
(i.e., green attitude), there is less willingness to having business rela-
tionships with the greenwashers than in cases with low levels of the
green attitude. In other words, managers with a higher green attitude
penalize more greenwashing behaviors than managers with a lower
green attitude. Conversely, under a high green attitude scenario, there
TABLE 7 Manipulation checks of individual stimulus
Check Green MVV (mean) Corporate MVV (mean) F p-value
The mission, vision and values of Nitraldansa, visible
on its website, clearly focus on transmitting its
total commitment to the environment
5.52 4.24 36.15 .00
Nitraldansa's website has content on environmental
aspects of the company
4.92 3.90 22.86 .00
Check Negative news (mean) Positive news (mean) F p-value
Nitraldansa is a clear example for the rest of the
companies in the sector on how the environmental
aspects in a company should be treated to
guarantee low environmental impact
3.35 5.30 113.70 .00
Nitraldansa has good environmental performance 3.14 5.32 111.36 .00
TABLE 8 Bonferroni test of post hoc comparisons
(I) Treatment group (J) Treatment group Mean difference (I-J) SE Sig.
Confidence interval 95%
Lower bound Upper bound
Passivists Brownwashers −0.89 0.22 0.000 −1.47 −0.30
Greenwashers 0.22 0.22 1.000 −0.36 0.81
Greenests −1.04 0.22 0.000 −1.63 −0.45
Brownwashers Passivists 0.89 0.22 0.000 0.30 1.47
Greenwashers 1.11 0.22 0.000 0.52 1.70
Greenests −0.15 0.22 1.000 −0.74 0.44
Greenwashers Passivists −0.22 0.22 1.000 −0.81 0.36
Brownwashers −1.11 0.22 0.000 −1.70 −0.52
Greenests −1.26 0.22 0.000 −1.85 −0.66
Greenests Passivists 1.04 0.22 0.000 0.45 1.63
Brownwashers 0.15 0.22 1.000 −0.44 0.74
Greenwashers 1.26 0.22 0.000 0.66 1.85
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is more willingness to having business relationships with the
brownwashers and the greenest groups in comparison with the low
levels of green attitude. Expressly, managers with a higher green atti-
tude are more interested in business relationships with the
brownwashers or the greenest firms than managers with a lower
green attitude. In view of these findings we cannot reject Hypotheses
2a and 2b, respectively.
5.4 | Cross-validation check
We carried out 10 semi-structured interviews (47 minutes of duration
on average) with seven top executive managers (four from SME1s and
three from large companies) and three area managers (one from an
SME and two from large companies). First, we asked the experts if
they thought we presented our stimuli effectively and executed the
procedure appropriately. All of them agreed with our research experi-
mental approach. We then questioned them about our findings on the
two hypotheses. Again, all of them agreed with our empirical results
when discussing the negative effect of perceived greenwashing on
the willingness to have business relationships, that is, with the results
obtained regarding Hypothesis 1. All of them alluded to the impor-
tance of trust in the business world. Further, in relation to Hypothe-
sis 2, all managers claimed that in the presence of high environmental
protection attitude, they would want to have business relationships
with other companies with the same vision toward the natural envi-
ronment, avoiding greenwasher behavior. However, managers who
work in large companies stated that if a potential client or supplier is
carrying out greenwashing practices, the economic element usually
weighted more in making a decision than the environmental one,
although these practices undoubtedly affect business relationships.
Finally, we asked managers for their opinion on the level of reality,
usefulness, and applicability of the experimental results obtained.
They answered that the results obtained are very reasonable, and
their managerial implications could be helpful for managers. From
these cross-validation outcomes, we can conclude that our experi-
mental results offer a realistic and consistent vision about the per-
ceived greenwashing effect on the managerial decision-making
process.
6 | CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
This study used an experimental design to empirically demonstrate
that managerial decisions could be influenced by greenwashing and
how this relationship could be moderated by the managers' attitude
toward environmental management.
Our findings contribute significantly, from a methodological per-
spective, to existing research on greenwashing. According to Chatterji
et al. (2016:117-118), the main advantages of using field experiments
in management research are (a) to create exogenous variation to iden-
tify causal relationships clearly, instead of being constrained by existing
data; (b) to assess specific processes and activities inside firms, where
traditional data sources are unable to provide sufficient detail; and (c) to
obtain more confidence regarding any difference between the treat-
ment and control means due to the intervention. This study gave us the
opportunity to confirm these three main advantages of experimental
design in at least two ways. On the one hand, based on the prior
TABLE 9 Testing moderation effects using hierarchical multiple regression
B SE B 95% CI β R2
Step 1
Greenwasher group (GW) −0.22 −0.07 −0.65,0.20 −.07
Brownwasher group (BR) 0.87** 0.22 0.44,1.30 .29**
Greenest group (GR) 1.02** 0.33 0.59,1.46 .33**
Green attitude (GA) 0.25 0.09 −0.05,0.56 .09 0.16**
Step 2
GW X GA −0.76** 0.20 −1.16,-0.36 −1.45**
BR X GA 0.71** 0.18 0.35,1.07 1.35**
GR X GA 0.46* 0.20 0.06,0.86 0.87* 0.17**
*p < .05.
**p < .00.
F IGURE 2 Effect of treatment groups and green attitude on
managerial decision
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literature, we created a stimulus to simultaneously manipulate both
green/general corporate messages on a firm's website and the positive/
poor environmental performance of the firm. These two manipulated
variables corresponded with the seminal definition of Delmas and
Burbano (2011:65), who suggested that greenwashing is “the inter-
section of two firm behaviours: poor environmental performance and
positive communication about environmental performance.” By manip-
ulating these two variables, which are the origin of greenwashing, it is
easier to identify causal relationships related to greenwashing. It is now
essential to note that consequently our results have contributed to
develop an empirical measure of the concept of greenwashing through
experimental design. On the other hand, using our experimental proce-
dure, we isolate the effect of perceived greenwashing on managerial
decisions, as this methodological approach is one of the best ways to
assess managerial behaviors that are not possible to analyze using tradi-
tional data sources, as stated by Chatterji et al. (2016). Specifically, our
results present empirical evidence about the effect of greenwashing on
managerial decisions, demonstrating that when perceived greenwashing
increases, the managerial willingness of collaborating with the
greenwasher decreases.
Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, our findings contrib-
ute to existing research in at least four ways. First, Aguinis and
Glavas (2012), in their theoretical review of the CSR issues, noted the
need for more research at an individual level, recommending the study
of the bidirectional relationship between the aspects at the organiza-
tional or institutional level and the individual level. Consistent with this
recommendation, we consider that the perception of greenwashing as
well as an individual's green attitude are two of the multiple underlying
mechanisms that contribute to explaining the micro-foundations on the
CSR concerning how individual variables affect organizational variables.
Specifically, our work attempts to examine how greenwashing affects
managerial decision-making (individual behavior) and how green atti-
tude (managerial values) affects managerial decision-making in the pres-
ence of greenwashing (firm strategic priorities), making a theoretical
contribution to the literature on the CSR. Second, from the stake-
holders'' engagement perspective, our findings are also interesting, as
firms have to integrate the preferences and needs of their stakeholders
in their strategy (Ferrón-Vílchez, Darnall, & Aragón-Correa, 2017), to
add value to the firm and obtain a competitive advantage. In this
respect, our results suggest that greenwashing could influence the man-
agerial decisions of several stakeholders such as suppliers, clients, or
investors, among others. This result is in agreement with prior studies
that concluded greenwashing could be understood as a firm's response
to the stakeholders' preferences with the objective of building a better
corporate image than their real image (Lyon & Montgomery, 2015), but
it only works in the short-term, that is, until the real intention is discov-
ered. At that point, managers who perceive greenwashing start to form
negative feelings about the greenwasher, which also negatively affects
their willingness to start or continue the business relationship with the
greenwasher. Third, Siano et al. (2017) considered that it is necessary
to make a greater number of empirical contributions whose results
review the traditional approach to the CSR communication practices,
thus excavating the usefulness of greenwashing practices. Our empirical
results shed light on this fact, demonstrating that a manager's percep-
tion that one of the stakeholders is a greenwasher, can significantly
affect managerial decisions on whether to establish (or not) a business
relationship with that stakeholder. Furthermore, these results are also
especially interesting as a theoretical contribution to the literature on
greenwashing since, although prior studies have analyzed the perceived
greenwashing under the lens of the decision-making of consumers
(e.g., de Vries et al., 2015; Nyilasy et al., 2014; Szabo & Webster, 2020),
they had not focused on the decision-making of managers. Finally, our
results also show that the relationship between perceived greenwash-
ing and the willingness to have business relationships is moderated by a
high level of managerial green attitude. This could be explained by the
fact that the managerial knowledge and feelings are intrinsic to the
decision-making of the firm, and there would be high correlation
between both. Literature explaining the effect of managers' perception
on the strategic decision-making of the firm is plenteous (Cordano &
Frieze, 2000; Sharma, 2000). In this respect, prior research argues that
the attitudes and preferences of individual managers influence the
decision-making related to environmental management, motivating the
adoption of green practices in the firm (Cordano & Frieze, 2000;
Sharma, 2000). In addition, Banerjee (2001) indicated that environmen-
tal issues are integrated at higher levels of strategy when managerial
awareness is high. Consequently, our results corroborate the arguments
of prior literature about green managerial attitudes and preferences by
showing that high managerial green attitude has a negative moderating
effect on the relationship between perceived greenwashing and the
willingness to have business relationships. In other words, when the
level of managerial green attitude is high, there is less willingness to
have business relationship when perceived greenwashing exists. This is
in line with Wassmer, Paquin, and Sharma (2012), who stated that some
firms' collaborations might have potentially negative consequences
when they are managed poorly, and they may even destroy firm value.
Owing to the potential risk of losing firm value, the strategic response
of firms with an environmental managerial attitude is to decline poten-
tial collaborations with greenwashers. As hypothesized, managers with
high levels of green attitude are likely to be more critical of greenwash-
ing behaviors. Overall, we can conclude that greenwashing is a short-
term strategy that consists of poor environmental performance and
high environmental disclosure. This may behave in the expected way
for a short period of time, until stakeholders understand the real situa-
tion of the greenwasher. This results in a drastic drop in the image and
reputation of the greenwasher, requiring a long time to recover.
6.1 | Future lines
This study is bounded by our experimental design, and therefore, our
results are not exempt from several limitations. Prospective research
would benefit from studying the proposed relationship using managers
as participants directly and discerning whether significant differences
could exist between “managers' perceptions” and “potential managers'
perceptions” about greenwashing. Further, we considered the moderat-
ing effect of “green attitude” in the relationship between perceived
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greenwashing and managerial decisions. Future studies could use other
moderators that could influence this relationship, such as managerial
green skepticism (Leonidou & Skarmeas, 2017) or belonging to a
“green” team (De la Torre et al., 2015). Finally, despite the advantages
of testing the proposed relationships using an experimental design
(e.g., Chatterji et al., 2016; Delmas & Aragón Correa, 2016), it would
also be especially interesting to be able to corroborate whether our
findings were similar to those obtained through a managerial survey.
6.2 | Managerial implications
Now, it is interesting to respond to the question in the introduction: is
it possible that the behavior of a greenwasher does not affect its cor-
porate image, and therefore, its relations with external agents? Our
results show that managers tend to be less willing to have business
relationships with greenwashers. How is it possible that Volkswagen
Group was the largest automaker worldwide in recent years, despite
greenwashing? This work has isolated the greenwashing effect on
managerial decision-making. However, other organizational variables
could be influencing the Volkswagen Group's relationships with its
stakeholders, such as long-term contractual relations with suppliers,
internal agreements with investors, and so on. Unfortunately, these
variables are not the focus of this study.
By manipulating both green/general corporate messages on a firm's
website and the positive/poor environmental performance of the firm,
it is possible to obtain more confidence about the effect of greenwash-
ing on managerial decisions. We suggest that this isolated analysis is
not only essential for advances and contributions (theoretical and
empirical) in the study of environmental management but also for offer-
ing important implications for practitioners. For instance, it is particu-
larly interesting to understand how other managers might react when
they discover greenwashing behavior in their clients, suppliers, or com-
mercial partners; would they be willing to break a contractual relation-
ship or would they be unaffected by accusations of greenwashing from
their business partners? Further, we consider that the potential results
of our proposal could be extrapolated to similar research contexts that
attempt to move forward not only in greenwashing-related behavior
but also in other management practices related to organizational sus-
tainable development (Zollo, Cennamo, & Neumann, 2013).
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APPENDIX A
Presented texts of MVV treatments on the stimulus
General corporate MVV treatment Green MVV treatment
Since its establishment in 1956, the company has been guided by solid principles that have set its course. The company is committed to science as
the basis of its growth, always taking into account the following principles for its decision making:
• Our mission is the continuous generation of innovations that allow
us to improve the efficiency of our clients.
• Our vision is to be the leading company in the European chemical
sector with the help of our innovative perspective.
• Our values are honesty and integrity with our customers and
respect for the people who work in the company.
• Our mission is the continuous generation of environmental
innovations that allow us to improve the eco-efficiency of our
clients and reduce the impact of their ecological footprint.
• Our vision is to be the leading company in the European chemical
sector due to our perspective based on environmental innovations.
• Our values are the sustainable development of the planet, honesty,
and integrity with our customers and respect for the people who
work in the company.
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APPENDIX B
Corporate General MVV
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Green MVV.
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Positive news.
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Negative news.
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APPENDIX C
Presented texts of news treatments on the stimulus
Environmental performance treatment
“Good” “Poor”
“The company,” winner of the “Green Chemical Challenge 201900 “The company” has lost to a direct competitor in the “Green
Chemical Challenge 2019”
The contest organized by the Spanish Environmental Protection
Agency (EPMS) named the company “[name]”as the winner for the
development of a new organic-mineral fertilizer suitable for organic
farming. The company has comfortably exceeded the requirements
established by the EPMS to qualify for the prize in its category
“ecological company of the year.”
To qualify for the “green chemical challenge” award, an average rating
of more than 80% must be obtained in the degree of compliance for
the following analyzed dimensions: Minimization of impacts and
ecological footprint, improvement in eco-efficiency, development of
ecological products and level of environmental innovation. The
company obtained a 95% compliance rating.
The contest organized by the Spanish Environmental Protection
Agency (EPMS) did not name the company “[name]” as a winner in
its current edition. The company has not exceeded the
requirements established by the EPMS to qualify for the prize in its
category “ecological company of the year.”
To qualify for the “green chemical challenge” award, an average rating
of more than 80% must be obtained in the degree of compliance for
the following analyzed dimensions: Minimization of impacts and
ecological footprint, improvement in eco-efficiency, development of
ecological products and level of environmental innovation. The
company obtained a rating below 40% compliance.
Obtaining this award recognizes the efforts of chemical companies to develop products and productive processes that respect the environment in an
industry with a high environmental impact. This award is internationally recognized and gives the winning companies international notoriety,
distinguishing the winners as environmentally responsible companies.
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